COMMENTS
DIVORCE REFORM-ONE STATE'S SOLUTION
Although New York has long been a leader in reform legislation,
it has also had one of -the most ineffective divorce laws in the
nation. Therefore, it was not unrealistic to hope that when New
York recently revised its divorce laws the new product would serve
as a model for future reforms in other jurisdictions. While the
new law as finally enacted is defective in several respects, its provisions reflect an attempt to accommodate the basic reform trends
in current divorce law. This comment investigates briefly the
evolution of governmental controls of divorce, the American tradition prior to the New York reform, and the implications of the
procedures finally adopted by that state.
EVOLUTION OF DIVORCE LAW AND POLICY

of the basic elements of the system of divorce
law prevalent in the United States can be traced primarily to Roman
and early Christian antecedents.' The earliest rudiments of current
principles appeared in Roman society prior to the Empire. There
the method of termination of marriage depended upon whether cere2
monial formalities accompanied the inception of the marriage.
Since marriage was a consensual relationship not controlled by the
state,3 a marriage based on consent alone without the appropriate
ceremony was dissoluble at the will of either party. 4 If the marriage
T

HE DEVELOPMENT

I See 2
as BRYCE].

J.

BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 786 (1901)
See generally R.

[hereinafter cited

DE POMERAT, MARRIAGE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 168-81

(1930) [hereinafter cited as DE POMERAi]; J. LICHTENBERGER, DrvORCE 74-99 (1931) [hereinafter cited as LICHTENBERGER]; 3 E. WESTERMARCK, HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 319-77
(1925); E. WESTERMARCK, A SHORT HISTORY OF MARRIAGE 286-98 (1926) [hereinafter
cited as WESTERMARCK].
2 2 BRYCE 800-01; LICHTENBERGER 54-59; C. THWING, THE FAMILY 39-40 (1913) [hereinafter cited as THWING]; "VEsTERMARCK 286-87.
There were two types of binding marriage. Confarreatio, originating in an early
religious ceremony, was the formal right that placed the patrician wife in the power
(manus) of her husband. The plebian marriage was initially a free association with
no legal incidents, but after the granting of citizenship to the plebians in 455 B.C., they
could contract legal marriages by ceremony in the form of a symbolic sale, coemptio. DE
PoiERAi 170-73.
82 BRYCE 798-99.

'Id. at 799-800; DE POMERAI 173.
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were accompanied by the prescribed ritual, a husband could sever
the union only upon a finding of fault by a family council.5 Later,
consensual dissolution and perhaps even dissolution at the will of
either party was extended to ritual marriages.6 By the time of the
Empire, the ritualistic aspects of marriage were no longer required,
with the result that the relationship was terminable at will"
By the beginning of the fifth century, the Christian church had
begun to exert its influence on the prevailing divorce laws. While
marriage could still be terminated at will, 8 capricious dissolution in
the absence of fault was subject to penal sanctions. As the influence
of the church became predominant, marriage was subsumed as a
sacrament of the church, and the law of divorce underwent a fundamental change. Unlike the more liberal Roman law, the church
viewed marriage as indissoluble. 9 Yet, the prerequisites to the
formation of a valid marriage became so complex that a scholar
could find an impediment to the sufficiency of almost any union °
In addition to the theoretical indissolubility of marriage, spouses
were under an affirmative duty to cohabit." While relief from
this obligation could be had in the form of a divorce mense et thoro,
which is similar to a judicial separation, the marriage bond itself
was not dissolved,' 2 thereby preventing remarriage. 3 In contrast
to the Roman law under which absolute divorce could be based on
the will of one spouse, the duty to cohabit could not be waived by
2 BRYCE 800; DE POMERAi 171. Divorce in earlier times was the right of the husband, and the acceptable causes seem to have been limited to adultery, preparing
poisons, and falsification of keys. Under the Twelve Tables the right became reciprocal.
LICHTENBERGER 57.
e THWING 39-40; WESTERMARCK 287. When first allowed, the right to dissolve the
union seems to have been rigidly circumscribed by the censors and public opinion.
See 2 BRYCE 800-01.
LICHTENBERGER 57-58.
8 2 BRYCE 803-05; DE POMERAI 173-78.
9 2 BRYCE 825-26. See generally T. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLIS, & F. KORTH, CANON LAW

(4th ed. 1939). Although theoretically indissoluble, see Canon 1013, a valid marriage
may be terminated under two exceptions. If the marriage is not consummated, it may
be dissolved by papal dispensation. Canon 1119. If a married person converts and his
or her spouse makes practice of the new religion difficult, the first marriage may be
dissolved by remarriage under the Pauline privilege if neither spouse was baptized at
the time of the first marriage, see Corinthians7:12-15, or by papal authority if one of
the spouses in the first marriage was baptized and one was not.
20 E.g., 2 BRYCE 826-27; DE POMERAI 179; WESTERMARCK 290.
11 Canon 1128; see WESTERMARCK 289.
122 BRYCE 827; LICHTENBERGER 89.
'3 2 BRYCE 827; DE PossERAi 178-79; LICHTENBERCER 89.
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consent. Separation required a finding of fault on the part of one
spouse in the form of heresy, adutery, or cruelty. 14
While there is some dispute as to the binding effect on the Church
of England of decisions made in Rome,1 5 the system of matrimonial law of the Roman church was enforced in England's ecclesiastical courts even after Henry VIII assumed authority over marriage
and divorce in 1532.16 Although absolute divorce became available
through action of Parliament after 1669,' the theory of indissoluble
marriage was enforced by ecclesiastical tribunals until the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.18 The system of ecclesiastical courts,
which was not terminated in England until 1857, was in effect during the period from the settlement of the English colonies in America
until their independence. Consequently, the law of that period was
arguably part of the common law incorporated into the law of the
several states."" However, since this type of court was never utilized
in this country, the only courts with jurisdiction over marital causes
were statutorily created.20 Apparently influenced by new social conditions and ideas of the reformation, colonial legislators provided for
absolute divorce rather than restricting relief to judicial separations. 21 Although the form of relief was changed, the principles on
1 2 BRYCE 827; see DE POMERAI 178-79.
21 Compare C. DUGGAN, TWELFTH CENTURY DECRETAL COLLECTIONS (1963), with F.
MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAiV IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1898).
1
GIt has been said that during the reign of Queen Elizabeth absolute divorce for
adultery was available but that this position was contracted in Foliamb's Case in 1602
wherein only divorce a mense et thoro was allowed. 91 Eng. Rep. 738 (K.B.). This view
of divorce was retained despite Henry VIII's assumption of authority over marriage and
divorce. See 24 Hen. VIII (1533); 1 W. HoLDswoRm, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 588-92
[hereinafter cited as HoLnswoRmn].
(1922)
1
7Surprisingly, considering the source of Henry's difficulties with the church in
Rome, see McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach, 9 VAND. L. REv. 685, 686 (1956),
the first absolute divorce through Parliament was not until the case of Lord deRoos
in 1669. See 1 J. BisHoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 1425 (1891) [hereinafter cited as BISHOP].
18 1 HoLDswoRTH 622-23; see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

393-94 (2d ed. 1923).
20 See I BISHOP §§ 116-49.
20 1 BISHOP § 116; 2 BRYCE 830.
21 See W. GOODSELL, A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY AS A SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION 341-82 (1938); G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 195

(1960). Absolute divorce was not granted in the middle and southern colonies until
New York serves as an example
after the revolution. See GOODSELL, supra at 380-82.
of the effect of the English influence in these colonies. As a state which had been
ruled by the Dutch and English, its policies shifted with its colonial masters. There
were absolute divorces under the Dutch; but except for a few divorces granted by the
royal governor, apparently under the misapprehension that Dutch law still applied,
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which relief was based were not. The nonwaivable fault grounds
and defenses which developed for judicial separations in the ecclesi22
astical courts became the colonial "common law" of divorce.
After the removal of marriage from the exclusive jurisdiction of
the church, the courts generally held that the relationship resulted

from a civil contract formed by the consent of the parties. However,
under the new view, the lack of a theoretical justification for a state's
disallowing termination by consent caused some difficulty.23 In
1852 Bishop suggested a basis in theory when he contended that
marriage was a status and not a contract, 24 a view which gained substantial judicial recognition. 25 Despite the groping for a satisfactory
rationalization for governmental sanctioning of divorces, the judiciary never doubted the necessity of such control.2 6 However, in
the view of Justice Story, even though state approval of a dissolution
could be made prerequisite to its validity, governmental power to
control divorce was not absolute. 27 Because some contractual aspects
of marriage could be found, Story speculated that termination of

marriage in the absence of consent or fault might be unconstitutional
as an impairment of the obligation of contract. This idea was refuted, however, in Maynard v. Hil25 when the Supreme Court
upheld a legislative divorce granted to a domiciliary whose nonresident spouse had not been at fault and from whom no consent had
been obtained.P
none were granted under English rule. Responding to public pressure, the legislature
provided for absolute divorce after independence. See notes 63 & 64 infra and accompanying text. On the other hand, with only slight exception, South Carolina, another

English colony in this class, provided no absolute divorce until 1950. See note 31 infra.
2 See Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952); McCurdy, supra note 17, at
685; Neuner, Proposed New Techniques in the Law of Divorce-The Compromise Solution, 28 IowA L. REv. 272 (1943); Silving, Divorce Without Fault, 29 IowA L. R-v. 527
(1944).
2"See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 694 (1819) (Story,
J., dissenting); Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana 181 (Ky. Ch. 1838); Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige
108, 111 (N.Y. Ch. 1830); 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES 417-18 (12th ed. 1896). See also 1
BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARES 433, 442 (5th ed. 1773).
2" See I BISHOP § 34.
"2Id. §§ 11, 34.

See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
Story suggested that fault of the divorced party was required. Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 694 (1819) (dissenting opinion). See 1 KENT,
COMMENTAmES 418 (12th ed. 1896).
28
27

"125 U.S. 190 (1888).

2 The Court indicated that the divorce could have had no effect on vested property
rights although it would terminate dower and curtesy. Id. at 216. However, the
Supreme Court subsequently decided that support rights are not terminated by an ex
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Granting that the state can terminate a marriage without the
consent or fault of the party against whom a petition is filed, 30 a more
difficult question occurs as to the circumstances under which a state
should grant a divorce.3 1 Most commentators find an answer by correlating the state's interest with the functional status of each individual marriage: it is in the state's interest to allow termination of
a marriage that has ceased to provide social stability and thereby has
failed to fulfill the purposes for which it was established. 32 Various
parte decree of a jurisdiction other than the domicile of the unrepresented spouse,
whether or not those rights were reduccd to judgment in a separation action prior to
the ex parte decree. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,
354 U.S. 416 (1957). These decisions overrule the language in Maynard as to jurisdiction to terminate property rights, but not as to power to dissolve marriages.
30 Although there is dictum in an old leading case to the effect that marriage may
be terminated without the fault or consent of either party if in the public interest, see
Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana 181, 184 (Ky. Ch. 1838), no holding on this precise issue
has been found.
-'Absolute prohibition of divorce has generally proven undesirable. In South
Carolina, where divorce was prohibited until 1950 except for a brief period during
reconstruction, disgruntled spouses merely migrated to nearby states or established illicit
liaisons. See P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 109-12 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as JACOBSON]; Brearley, A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinians,2
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1935). In "divorceless" England where migration was not
so easy, there was widespread adultery, desertion, and bigamy. Mueller, Inquiry into
the Stat6 of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV. 545 (1957); see Rheinstein, The
Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633, 649-51
(1956). Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the welfare of children, sometimes offered as a justification of prohibition, is protected by such a policy. That children are adversely affected by divorce seems established, see J. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF
DIVORCE (1953); W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 310 (1956), but a separation may affect them
more adversely and so may a continued unhappy home, though adequate evidence
is lacking, see GOODE, supra at 310-11.
In fact, provided some grounds are available, the restrictiveness of grounds bears
no significant relationship to the rate of or desire for divorce. See LICHTENBERGER 171-86.
Although there may be some question of the efficacy of these criteria to measure
actual marriage breakdown, the limited information available indicates that the effect
of other social and economic variables greatly overshadows the effect of variation in
divorce laws. See Rheinstein, supra at 658-64. Therefore, it is more probable that
the phenomena of family instability and a relaxed divorce law were both products of
more basic economic and social changes rather than that the relaxed divorce law created
a higher rate of instability. See JACOBSON 88-96. However, it is important to note that
the U.S.S.R. was forced by family instability and juvenile delinquency to replace
restrictions on divorce after a period of almost complete freedom of dissolution. See
J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SoviET LEGAL SYsTES!, pt. 3, at 99-102 (1962).
32 See, e.g., N. KOHUT, A MANUAL ON MAmrIAL RECONCILUTIONS 11 (1964); Alexander,
The Family Court-An Obstacle Race, 19 U. PrrT. L. REV. 602, 614-18 (1958); Bradway,
The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REV. 377, 389-92 (1987), reprinted in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMmY LAW 937, 948 (1950); Fenberg, Can Divorce Be Made Respectable?, 45 WomErN LAw. J., Summer, 1959, at 13; Johnstone, Divorce: The Place of
the Legal System in Dealing with Marital Discord Cases, 31 ORE. L. REV. 297, 301-02
(1952); Rheinstein, supra note 31, at 645-48; Rutman, Departurefrom Fault, 1 J. FAM.
L. 181, 182 (1961). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Reynolds v.
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phrases have been employed to describe the marriage at this stage,
among them "dead,"33 "broken," 34 and "permanently disrupted."35
However, there is no agreement in defining the status so labeled.36
Recommendations for nonfault legal, as opposed to sociological,
criteria have generally fallen into two categories: separation for a
period and failure of conciliation procedures.3 7 Strong appeals
also have been made by eminent authorities for the establishment
of "socialized," nonadversary, consolidated family courts having
jurisdiction over all actions in order to facilitate more effective employment of the conciliation approach. 38
The separation period approach is based on the premise that a
lengthy separation serves both as a check on capricious dissolution of
marriages and as an indication that the marriage is sufficiently disUnited States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 86 N.E. 949 (1909); Atkeson

v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 90 Okla. 154, 216 P. 467 (1923); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 46-5-1

(1963); C. HOWARDt

& R. SUMMERS, LAw: iTsNATURE, FUNCTION AND LIMITs 181-

82 (1965).
However, it has been noted that: "The State has a profound and continuing interest
in preserving the family as the basic unit of society and in promoting the welfare of the
home; and .... the legislature finds that the increase in divorces and annulments is
seriously detrimental to society and especially to the welfare of the children affected
thereby .... REPORT JOINT LEG. COMM. ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAW, N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 8, p. 9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as JLC REPORT] (quote from concurrent resolution re-establishing the JLC for 1966).
"1966 JLC REPORT 21-23.
24 KOHUT, supra note 32, at 9.
31McCurdy, supra note 17, at 706.
36 For a survey of various attempts at definition, see KOHUT, supra note 32, at 13-25,
37See notes 39-56 infra and accompanying text. Another nonfault ground that has
received some support from the commentators is incompatability. See Rutman, supra
note 32, at 192. This ground, however, has received very limited official acceptance

and is presently a recognized ground in only two states, New Mexico and Oklahoma.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961). But see Rutman, supra note 32, at 190. One of these jurisdictions has considerably weakened the
nonfault basis of the ground by allowing consideration of recriminatory defenses in
the discretion of the court. Compare Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826
(1946), with Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950).
31See Alexander, supra note 32; O'Connell, Divorce-A Public or Private Affair,
1965 PROC.EEINGs ABA SEC. OF FAM. L. 40; Pound, The Place of the Family Court in
the Judicial System, 5 NPPA J. 161 (1959). See generally Committee on the Standard
Family Court Act, Standard Family Court Act-Text and Commentary, 5 NPPA J.97-211
(1959).

The Children's Court of Conciliation in Los Angeles has demonstrated that conciliation procedures need not be associated with a consolidated family court system in order
to be successful. See Foster, Conciliaiton and Counseling in the Courts in Family
Law Cases, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 353, 364-67 (1966). The new New York conciliation
machinery in divorce cases, which is to be considered in detail below, was made part
of the Supreme Court, a court of general jurisdiction, rather than being annexed to
the state's Family Court which does not have divorce jurisdiction. See notes 120-21
infra and accompanying text.
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rupted to establish that the state's goal of preserving a stable social
unit is no longer attainable.39 It is argued that such a criterion
covertly recognizes consent-the factor that is the basis for most
divorces anyway-and, therefore, provides a much more reliable indicator of the extent of disharmony in a particular marriage than is
provided by a fault requirement. 40 Separation period grounds are
no longer unique, having been adopted in fifteen states with the
requisite periods varying from one to ten years. 4 1 Most of the states
allowing divorces on this basis have abandoned the fault principle
at least to the extent of refusing to recognize the common law defense
m 2
of recrimination.
The courts of other jurisdictions in which
abandonment will not satisfy this ground consider fault in ascertaining the voluntary nature of the separation. 43 Those states requiring
voluntary separation have provided nonfault relief to approximately
eighty five or ninety percent of those persons seeking divorce, but
have left fault grounds as the only alternative to the ten or fifteen
3

9 See Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 76 Idaho 95, 100-01, 278 P.2d 200, 202-03 (1954); Matysek v.
Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 50-54, 128 A.2d 627, 631-32 (1957); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12, 41
P.2d 1059 (1935); Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 236, 172 A. 323 (1934); McCall, Living Separate
and Apart for Five Years and the FederalMatrimonialCauses Act, 5 U. WEST. Aui. L.
REv. 51, 54 (1960); McCurdy, supra note 17, at 706-07; Rutman, supra note 32, at 192;
WVadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 81-87 (1966).
,0 See Rheinstein, supra note 31, at 645-46; Rutman, supra note 82, at 192; Wadlington, supra note 39, at 81-87; Note, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 705, 706-09 (1949); Note, 1959
WAsH. U.L.Q. 189, 194-95, 199.
41 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956) (five years for any reason); ARx. STAT. ANN.

§ 34-1202

(Supp. 1965) (separation by voluntary act or mutual consent-three years);

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 13, § 1522 (Supp. 1966) (three years voluntary and no reasonable

expectation of reconciliation); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-610 (1963) (five years); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 403.020 (1962) (five years); LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 138, 139 (Supp. 1966) (one
year after separation decree-voluntarily and no reconciliation has taken place); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1966) (voluntarily live apart for eighteen months); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 125.010 (1963) (after three years separation at discretion of court); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Supp. 1965) (one year); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 15-5-3 (1956) (after ten
years at discretion of court); Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (Supp. 1966) (seven
years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1959) (three years without fault of libelant; resumption of marital relations not reasonably possible); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp.
1966) (two years); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.08.020 (Supp. 1965) (two years-regardless of
fault in separation); Wis. STAT. ANN. §247.07 (Supp. 1967) (five years-voluntarily
living entirely apart).
,2 See, e.g., cases cited note 39 supra. In considering petitions alleging satisfaction
of the statutory separation period, some courts inquire into fault only as an aid in
evaluating whether conciliation is possible. See Pearson v. Pearson, 77 Nev. 76, 80, 559
P.2d 386, 388-89 (1961); Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 236, 172 A. 323 (1934).
" See Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1202 (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522 (Supp. 1966); LA. CIVIL CODE
ANN. arts. 138-39 (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 247.07 (Supp. 1967).
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percent whose spouses will not consent. 44 Finally, some states permit conversion of separation decrees into decrees for absolute divorce
by either spouse after a specified period of continued separation. 45
Apparently the premise of this procedure is that after spouses have
lived apart for the requisite period, the proof of a broken marriage
is sufficient to discount any interest the state had in its continuation.46 As in the case of separation by agreement, this conversion
procedure seems necessarily to contain an element of consent since
a spouse agreeing to a judicial separation would probably have
knowledge of the statutory conversion feature.
Some commentators and a recent English proposal have gone
further toward abolishing fault than any of the above procedures
and have recommended that marriage disharmony evidenced by
separation or certain other indicia be the only ground for divorce.47
The English proposal provides that divorce should be possible even
48
in the absence of mutual consent.
A second criteria recommended as a determinant of marital
breakdown is the failure of attempts at conciliation through formal
procedures. This criteria is usually denoted mandatory or compulsory conciliation. 49 Advocates of this standard argue that not
only are fault grounds inadequate, but that separation periods, in
effect, leave the decision of whether the union is severed entirely to
the spouses. To give legal significance to a decision so made, a couple
merely has to live apart for the requisite period, while with the
assistance of counseling their marriage might have been preserved. 0
"Between 1946 and 1950 only 14.8% of divorces were contested. JACOBSON 120.
More recent New York figures show an even smaller percentage of contested actions.
From July 1, 1946, to July 1, 1956, only 7% were contested. In the final year of the
period, 1955-56, the figure was 9%. 1966 JLC REPORT 21-23.
" See ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1) (1959) (four years); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1
(1964) (three years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (Supp. 1966) (five years under limited
divorce and two years under separate maintenance decree); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-802
(Supp. 1966) (two years-in discretion of court up to two years); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-1 (Supp. 1965) (three years); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (Supp. 1967) (five years).
8 See Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512 (1921).
47 See A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SociETY, REPORT OF GROUP APPOINTED BY
ARCHBISHOP OF CANT. IN JAN. 1964, at 57 (1964); McCurdy, supra note 17, at 706-07;
Note, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 189, 194-95, 199. Such recommendations, however, do not
eliminate the possibility of conciliation as an additional consideration. Id.
"3See A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, REPORT OF GROUP APPOINTED BY
ARCHBISHOP OF CANT. IN JAN. 1964, at 33, 41, 57 (1964).
" See generally Foster, supra note 38; Lawless, Compulsory Conciliation for New
York?, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 457 (1965).
50 See KonuT, supra note 32, at 52-55.
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Other commentators contend that mandatory conciliation counseling
would be ineffective because individuals react adversely to attempts
at forced cooperation. 1 The validity of these objections will be
considered in detail in evaluating the New York procedure.
Conciliation procedures have been established by statute in eleven
states and the District of Columbia. 52 Further, two states have
abandoned such structures after their application proved unsuccessful.53 The two basic types of conciliation procedures, mandatory
and voluntary, are exemplified by the provisions adopted in the
state of Wisconsin and the city of Los Angeles. Wisconsin requires,
as a precondition to the filing of a petition for divorce, a report from
a concilation commissioner that mediation was attempted.5 4 Los
Angeles, on the other hand, maintains a separate tribunal which
initiates conciliation procedures on the petition of either spouse,
irrespective of whether other matrimonial relief is sought.5 While
in both jurisdictions attendance of one spouse can be compelled if
the other seeks conciliation, 56 the Wisconsin mandatory procedure
can be employed to compel both spouses to participate in the concili57
ation procedure although neither desires to do so.
Delay, a common factor in both the separation period ground and
conciliation procedures, is most objectionable to the divorce peti51 See W. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 36974 (1954); M. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT 250 (1956); McCurdy, supra note 17,
at 706-07; McIntyre, Conciliation for Disrupted Marriagesby or Through the judiciary,
4 J. FAMILY L. 117, 120-22 (1964); Rheinstein, supra note 31, at 635-40.
52See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1730-1747 (West 1955, Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§46-5-1 to 7 (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§25.171, 25.175 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 488A.12-17, 488A.68-81, 488A.29-34 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 215 to 215-g
(McKinney Supp. 1966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2301.03 (Page Supp. 1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 107.510 to 107.610 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-10-1 to 45 (Supp. 1966);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-110 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.12.050 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 247.13, 252.016 (Supp. 1967). See generally Foster, supra note 38; McIntrye, supra
note 51. See also People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 I1l.2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262
(1954) (holding Illinois provision unconstitutoinal); IND. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (unimplemented).
53

See REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITrTE ON CONCILIATION AND
RECONCILIATION (1963); Bodenheimer, The Utah Marriage Counseling Experiment: An
Account of Changes in Divorce Law and P'.cedure, 7 UTAH L. REv. 443, 449 (1961).
"'Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.081 (Supp. 1967); see Foster, supra note 38, at 358-60.
55 CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE § 1761 (West 1955); see Foster, supra note 38, at 364-67.
,6See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1766, 1772 (West 1955, Supp. 1967); note 204 infra.

57Reference to agencies outside the court must be voluntary. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
(Supp. 1967). Under the Los Angeles procedure, both spouses may be compelled if children will be affected. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1766, 1771 (West 1955, Supp.
1967).

§ 247.081
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tioner. Historically, provisions in divorce laws prohibiting, limiting,
or protracting a grant of relief have had their effectiveness reduced
by evasion devices. If only restrictive methods of divorce are provided, spouses simply desert, seek a divorce in another jurisdiction,
or find other means of dissolving the marriage. Also, if separation
periods are required for some grounds and not for others, spouses
tend to choose the statutory provisions without a separation period
even though the alternative necessitates admittance of less socially
acceptable conduct. 58 Even if a state adopts a divorce law structure
which forecloses evasion within the state, consenting spouses can
secure a divorce in another state with less stringent prerequisites.
Divorces achieved in this manner generally must be recognized by
the domiciliary state under the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution.59
Two approaches limiting migratory evasion of divorce law have
been attempted. First, efforts have been made to amend the Constitution to allow federal control.60 Divergent state policies concerning divorce and the absence of a pressing urgency on a national scale
18 Of the jurisdictions having a combination of separation period grounds and fault
grounds, without separation periods, most have a much higher percentage of decrees
granted on the basis of fault than on separation periods. The following data, which
includes only those states in the reporting area for the Census Bureau, graphically demonstrates this conclusion:
Cruelty Desertion Nonsupport -Other Not Stated
Total Adultery
State
States with Separation Periods
Idaho
Maryland
Virginia
Wisconsin

2,548
5,970
7,640
4,550

14
1,100
270
30

2,194
10
3,840

120
2,400
6,760
90

18
40

40
2,130*
600
340

112
330
10
210

500
80
62

100
60
558

States with Provisions for Conversion of Separation Decrees
Alabama
Tennessee
Utah

12,380
9,500
2,460

440
80
2

6,780
6,660
1,686

4,540
2,280
70

20
420
82

[Includes 1,960 decrees granted after a period of separation.] See 3 VITAL STATSTICS
Table 2-19 (1962).
59 See notes 221-25 infra and accompanying text.
10 See LICHTENBERGER 197-209. It is possible that such amendment is no longer necessary in order for the federal government to regulate divorce. See Corwin, The "Full
Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371, 388 (1933); D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce
in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. Rzy. 26, 63-64
(1966); Mayers, Ex Parte Divorce: A Proposed Federal Remedy, 54 COLUm. L. Rlv.
54, 59-61 (1954); cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (Commerce Clause).
OF THE UNITED STATs
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attempts.61

Also, case precedent
have apparently defeated these
has rendered futile unilateral efforts by a state to stop migratory
divorce by its domiciliaries; for it has been held that where both
parties appear and collateral objection to the finding of domicile is
barred in the rendering state by res judicata, the decree cannot be
attacked in any state.62 Finally, no uniform law would seem to be
03
able to satisfy all of the various policies of the several states.
From the brief outline provided here, it can be observed that
fault, which was introduced as a ground for divorce in Roman law
and became the basic concept under the influence of canon law, has
lost its exclusive status, and consent, limited by separation periods
and conciliation procedure, is frequently being introduced. Evasion,
intra- and interstate, is a threat, however, to effective implementation
of such reforms.
HISTORY AND SUBSTANCE OF NEW YORK DIvoRcE REFORM

Following a period of over one hundred years as colony and state
during which no judicial procedure for divorce was available, 4 New
York finally granted divorce jurisdiction to its equity courts in 1787.
The enabling statute was in some ways more restrictive than its
ecclesiastical predecessors, for adultery was specified as the only
ground for dissolution.6 5 As a result of legislative inaction, the substantive grounds for divorce remained unchanged until 1966.68
Nurtured by the existence of this single basis for termination
63See LiCITENBERGER 187-209.

The rate of migratory divorce probably amounts to

no more than three to five percent annually. JACOBSON 109. See also Currie, supra
note 60, at 63.
62 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
as see 2 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 7 (1932). Ten states have adopted the
UNIFoR DivoRcE RECOGNITION ACT; only two of these took the action subsequent to the
time when the full effect of the Sherrer decision became known. Of those states employing the format of the uniform law, several have applied restrictive qualifications to
the original provisions. See 9A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 457 (1965). Withdrawal of
the law is under consideration by the commissioners. See H. FOSTER & D. FREED, LAW
OF THE FAxmLy-NEw YORK 34 (Supp. 1966) [hereinafter cited as FosTER 9- FREED]; Note,
16 HAsnNGs L.J. 121 (1965).
O See Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach, 96 N.Y. 456, 459 (1884); Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N.Y.
134, 138 (1872); Burtis v. Burtis, I Hopk. Ch. 628, 637 (N.Y. 1825). See generally
Spalletta, Divorce in Colonial New York, 39 N.Y. HISTORICAL SOC. Q. 422 (1955).
as See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1787, ch. 69. Although theoretically power remained in the
legislature to grant divorces, no such case has been found; and in the 1846 Constitution,
the courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction. See N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 10 (1846) (now
art. 1, § 9) (no divorce to be granted except by due judicial proceeding).
"6Compare N.Y. Sess. Laws 1787, ch. 69, with N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 313, § 7,
repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 2.
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of the marriage status, intrastate evasion devices reached their ultimate development in New York. 67 A discontented spouse could
obtain a dissolution if his marriage partner had*disappeared for at
least five years, 8 had been found to be incurably insane for a"five
year period or impotent,6 9 or had been finally sentenced to life iriprisonment.7 0 In practice, the courts increased the availability of
annulment by interpreting fraud in the inducement of a*marriage
promise in a manner similar to that given fraud in the law of contracts.71 Also, the use of fraudulent evidence and the exploitation
of indifference of the bench provided a less acceptable liberalization
of a too restrictive law. 72 Finally, for those possessing sufficient
financial resources, divorce was always available in a sister state and,
more recently, in Mexico. 73
A widespread public interest that originated with the lower
court decisions in 1963-64 in the Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel and Wood
67 In 1965 New York marriages were dissolved by the following means: annulments2,942; divorce-4,149; dissolution for absence-327. 1966 N.Y. JUD. CONF. REP. 425. See
generally Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CORNL.L L.Q. 303 (1950).
68 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 220-21 (McKinney 1963). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§46-13 (1960).
61N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 140 (d), (f) (McKinney 1963). See also ALA. CODE tit. 34,
§ 20 (1958); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1201 (1946); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (Supp. 1966); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 42-301 (1943).
Annulment has been given the primary characteristics of divorce by provisions for
alimony, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1963), legitimation, N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 145 (McKinney 1963), and custody of children, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §240
(McKinney 1963).
7oSee N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6-2 (McKinney 1963) (does not apply if marriage
contracted during parole); In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 357, 39 N.E.2d 907, 912
(1942). See also HAwAI REv. LAws § 324-20 (1955); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 208, § 2 (1955).
71 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 140 (e) (McKinney 1963); Wels, supra note 67, at 31821; Note, 41 CoLumr. L. REv. 503 nA (1941). The general leniency of the courts did not
go unnoticed. In 1962 in New York there were 2,331 annulments and only 4,224
divorces as compared to 400,308 divorces and 12,692 annulments in the Census Bureau's
reporting area. See 3 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES Tables 2-2, 2-3 (1962).
72 See 1966 JLC REPORT 21-23; JACOBSON 115; H. O'GORMAN, LAwYER S AND MATmMONIAL CASES 25-30 (1963). "The investigation confirmed what had long been suspected,
widespread fraud, perjury, collusion and connivance pervade matrimonial actions of
Moreover, examination of the records of the Supreme Court leads
every type ....
to the conclusion that those charged with the administration of justice in this type
of litigation could not have been unaware of these conditions." 1948 New York County
Grand Jury Presentment, reprinted in 1957 JLC REPORT 105.
72"[The actual number of divorces] ... has probably been about one third to one
half greater than the number recorded in New York State; currently, it may even be
double, in view of the marked increase of Mexican divorces to Americans following...
New York Supreme Court [recognition] .... ." JAC.BSON 116. See Caswell
1952 ....
v. Caswell, 111 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 117 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1952).
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cases, 74

v. Wood
which held two bilateral Mexican divorces invalid,
apparently stimulated legislative action to formulate more realistic divorce procedures. While these cases were before the Court of Appeals,
the legislature authorized the Joint Legislative Committee for
Matrimonial and Family Laws (hereinafter JLC) to study the substantive law of divorce.7 5 Under pressure generated by the subsequent Court of Appeals decision in the Rosenstiel and Wood cases, 0
public JLC hearings,17 endorsements of JLC proposals by prominent
political leaders, 78 and Catholic lay support,79 the legislature was
prodded into action. After the legislative leaders resisted the bill
proposed by the JLC 0 and drafted their own, 81 the legislature accepted a compromise between the JLC-proposed Wilson-Sutton Bill
83
and the Leaders' Bill. 2 Although the reform is less than pervasive,
T'See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206, vacating
annulments granted in 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Wood v.
Wood, 41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
75 The JLC was created in 1957, but its functions were limited to inquiries into the
procedural aspects of divorce law; however, a concurrent resolution authorizing investigation of substantive grounds was passed on June 8, 1965. See FosTFR & FREED, Supp. at
5. Rosenstiel was argued Feb. 1, 1965, and decided July 9, 1965.
78 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966) (Rosenstiel and Wood consolidated for decision).
77The committee held a total of eight days of hearings in New York City, Buffalo,
and Albany. See 1966 JLC REPORT 13-16.
18 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1965, § I, at 40, col. 2 (Mayor Wagner of New
York City); N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1966, § 1, at 31, col. 4 (Mayor Lindsay of New York
City); N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (Senator Robert F. Kennedy).
79 A group of eighteen prominent Catholic laymen formed a Committee of Catholic
Citizens to Support Divorce Reform in New York State. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1966, § 1,
at 1, col. 4.
80
See 1966 JLC REPORT 85-106 for the JLC proposal.
81 See First Draft of Leaders' Bill (on file Duke University School of Law Library).
82 The three primary innovations of the bill are drawn from both proposals.
The
final statute contained substantially the same type grounds proposed by the JLC. Compare N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1966), with 1966 JLC REPORT 85.
However, clarifying language was added to the definition of cruel and inhuman treatment to ensure its extension to purely mental cruelty. Compare N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 170 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1966), with 1966 JLC REPORT 85-86. Criteria for divorce
for imprisonment were altered. Compare N.Y. Dom. RrL. LAW § 170 (3) (McKinney
Supp. 1966), with 1966 JLC REPORT 88-89. Written, recorded separation agreements
were added as a requirement for the ground of separation for two years, see N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAw § 170 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1966); and a new provision for conversion of
judicial separations to divorces after two years was provided, see N.Y. DoMs. REL.
LAW § 170 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1966). The Los Angeles type "voluntary" concilation
procedure recommended by the JLC was rejected in favor of a procedure somewhat
similar to that used in Wisconsin. See FosTER & FR.ED 21. Compare N.Y. Doms. REL.
LAw i§ 215 to 215-g (McKinney Supp. 1966), with 1966 JLC REPORT 99-103. A pro.
vision concerning migratory divorce was carried over from the Leaders' Bill. See N.Y.
Doss. REL. LAw § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
83 See notes 144-241 infra and accompanying text.
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the overall plan of the statute is commendable as an attempt to deal
with all the major reform proposals previously discussed. The new
law attempts to provide more realistic bases for divorce, including
nonfault grounds based on a separation period; 4 to establish a
conciliation procedure intended to preserve viable family units;8 5
and to restrict migratory evasions."8
The new grounds for divorce in New York include cruel and inhuman treatment, expanded from the former separation ground to
include mental cruelty,8 7 abandonment for two years,88 confinement
in prison for three consecutive years,8 and two years separation under a separation decree9 or a recorded separation agreement. 91
The combined effect of a redefinition of the original ground of
adultery9 2 the newly enacted bases, and the relief available under
93
annulment and dissolution in cases of absence or final life sentence,
,See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
id. §§ 215 to 215-g.
"See id. § 250.
87 Compare N.Y. Dom. R-.L. LAW § 170 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1966) ("conduct of the
defendant [which] ... endangers the physical or mental well being"), with N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1962, ch. 313, § 8, repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 2.
88 N.Y. Doss. RFL. LAW § 170 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
80 Id. § 170 (3): "[an action for divorce may be maintained on grounds of] the confinement of the defendant to prison for a period of three or more consecutive years after
"See

the marriage of plaintiff and defendant." The use of the preposition "for" in the phrase
"confinement . . . for a period" has already caused some confusion. While the press
release announcing the compromise bill states, "sentence is not material as a consideration but only the period of confinement," Press release, Wednesday, April 20, 1966, distinguished commentators have stated that the section probably is intended to refer to
sentence, FosTR & FR-., Supp. at 13. The sounder interpretation seems to be that the
"for" should be read as "during" and that actual confinement during three years is
required, since the introduction of waiting periods seems to have been a prime objective
of the new law and the original proposal from which this provision is derived requires
sentence for five years and confinement for two. See 1966 JLC REPORT 85, 88-89.
"0N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 170 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1966). This provision is similar
to those existing in several states. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1 (j) (1963)
(3 years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (8) (Supp. 1966) (5 years, limited divorce; 2 years,
separate maintenance).
91 N.Y. ,Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1966). See notes 114-18 infra and
accompanying text.
92 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1966) makes adultery a ground
for divorce, and defines it as "the commission of an act of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily performed by the defendant, with a person other than the plaintiff
after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant." This proviso is in response to Cohen v.
Cohen, 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951), which held homosexual acts were
not adultery. This provision, by restricting the grounds to acts with another person,
does not make bestiality a ground for divorce. See FOSTER & FREED, Supp. at 14.
"3See notes 68-70 supra.
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now provides New York with a divorce law system encompassing
most of the procedures recommended.
The most significant aspect of the new grounds is not their
number but their approach. More specifically, the nonfault theory
of divorce is extensively employed. 94 Two of the grounds, abandonment and imprisonment, contain waiting periods beginning with the
occurrence of the requisite culpable acts and lasting until the
accrual of a cause of action.9 5 These are not purely "cooling off"
periods in the usual sense of an interim during which spouses can
96
contemplate their actions before pursuing a divorce, but rather are
longer periods intended to evidence a breakdown of the marriage as
97
well as to allow for revaluation by the partners, and as such are
composite grounds importing a nonfault element. Separation for
two years under a separation agreement is a true nonfault ground
requiring only a showing that the marriage partners have lived
apart pursuant to the terms of the agreement.9 8 Separation for two
11See notes 8-28 supra for a discussion of the history of the fault principle. For an

exhaustive treatment of the nonfault approach in contemporary statutes, see Wadlington,
Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966).
05N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 170(2), (3) (McKinney Supp. 1966). The statute of limitations as applied to divorce and separation provides that no action may be brought on
a ground which arose more than five years before. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1966). There should be no difficulty in applying §210 to the ground
of abandonment because the ground arises two years after the initial abandonment. See
N.Y. Dom. R-m- LAw § 170 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1966). However, when the ground of
confinement to prison arises depends on whether "confinement ...for a period" refers
to sentence or confinement during sentence. As to the effect of confinement in other
jurisdictions see Note, 12 N.Y.L.F. 105, 107 (1966).
goSee, e.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-6 (1963) (90 days); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§46-16 (1960) (90 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-8 (Supp. 1965) (6 months); OHIO Rav.
CODE ANN. § 3105-09 (Supp. 1966) (6 weeks).
9""The [JLC's] proposal. . . is to permit divorce by reason of abandonment only
where it has continued for a period of two years or more, thus, demonstrating to the
state that the marriage is now a mere legal formality . . ." 1966 JLC REPORT 8 (emphasis added). As to its proposal for a ground of imprisonment for two years, lengthened
to three years in the statute, the JLC states: "[T]he proposal provides that the divorced
spouse must be imprisoned for at least two years prior to the divorce being granted;
this serves the purpose of (I) breaking the natural but sometimes too rash inclination
to dissolve a marriage upon the conviction of the wrongdoing party; (2) giving the
convicted party an opportunity to obtain 'his or her release from prison prior to disso.
lution of the marriage through reversal of the conviction on appeal." Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
98 In reference to its proposal for two years separation as a ground, which was
similar to the separation ground appearing in the statute, the JLC states: "If a couple
demonstrates to the state that their marriage is dead, the state should then, with
appropriate safeguards for the parties and their children, recognize the need for
divorce .... One of the most convincing ways in which it can be demonstrated that

a marriage is 'dead' is proof that a particular couple had lived separate and apart for
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years under a judicial decree can also be classified as a nonfault
ground, since either party to the separation action may "convert"
the original court order into a divorce decree by showing two years
of living apart and adherence to the terms of the separation decree. 99
The remaining grounds, adultery and cruel and inhuman treatment,
are traditional fault grounds, requiring no waiting or separation
period.10 0
In addition to the de-emphasis of culpability in the present
statute, the legislature also refrained from providing defenses for
all grounds except adultery. 10 1 Although the legislative history of
this omission is enigmatic, 0 2 it was apparently intended that none
of the traditional defenses be available for the new grounds. 0 3 Such
a continuous period of years." 1966 JLC REPORT 90. See McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach, 9 VAND. L. RPv. 685 (1956) (cited by committee report).
To avoid the trap laid by Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d

672 (1964), where the court held that a separation agreement made in contemplation
of divorce even without express provision for attaining a divorce was subject to attack
as against public policy, N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW §5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1966)

was passed barring attack in the absence of such an express provision.
9 Considering § 170 (6) separately, it is not clear that the defendant in the original
action can apply for a conversion to divorce, since that clause states that the plaintiff
may so apply. There is no specification of which plaintiff is intended-the one in the
initial separation suit or the one in the petition for conversion to divorce. Any doubt
is dispelled by reference to the immediately preceding clause, § 170 (5), which refers to
plaintiff in identical language, since that clause concerns application for divorce on
grounds of living apart for two years under a separation agreement-a procedure in
which there is no plaintiff in any proceeding except the one for divorce. It is therefore
apparent that plaintiff in both clauses refers to the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding.
100 N.Y. Dot. RxL. LAw §§ 170 (1), (4) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
101Although the title to the reform law indicates that N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 171
(McKinney Supp. 1966), which provides for defenses to adultery, is repealed, it apparently is merely a carryover from an earlier draft of the Leaders' Bill which provided
for such repeal. See First Draft of Leaders' Bill; FOSTER & FREED, Supp. at 9. In
the absence of a specific provision in the text, the new title would not have the effect
of repealing the original statute. Cf. Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471, 472-73,
136 N.E.2d 504, 506-07 (1956); People v. O'Neil, 280 App. Div. 145, 112 N.Y.S.2d 756
(1952); FOSTER & FREED, Supp. at 9. Therefore, § 171 is not repealed, and by its terms
it applies only to adultery.
102 Both the JLC proposal and the Leaders' Bill as originally drafted provided for
repeal of § 171. See 1966 JLC REPORT 95-97; First Draft of Leaders' Bill § 2. Since
the law as passed deletes any specific reference to § 171, the inference is that it was
deliberately left in effect and no other provided. See also note 101 supra.
108The failure to provide statutory defenses arguably results in no defenses being
available, since divorce law in New York is entirely statutory, see Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach, 96 N.Y. 456, 462-63 (1884); Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N.Y. 134, 138-39 (1872); Burtis
v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557, 564-68 (N.Y. 1825), except for matters traditionally within
the equity jurisdiction, see Griffin v. Griffin, supra at 139 (awarding counsel fees to
defendant's wife); Wightman v. Wightman, 4 John. Ch. 343 (N.Y. 1820) (lunacy of one
party at time of marriage renders marriage void); Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopk. Ch. 478,
493-94 (N.Y. 1825) (recognizing fraud as voiding marriage). But see 1 BisHoP § 129.
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a result is logically justifiable upon analysis of the philosophical
change attempted by the reform. The ground of adultery, based on
fault, has been accorded the full range of fault-based defenses including the basic ones of recrimination, collusion, connivance, and
condonation.10 4 Since separation by judicial decree or agreement is
based on principles of nonculpability, the defenses developed in a
fault oriented system would appear to be inapplicable, 0 5 except
insofar as the statutory defense of justification is made applicable in
the initial action for separation. 106 Finally, the statutory definitions
of the remaining provisions-cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, and confinement for three years-place an evidentiary burden
on the petitioner sufficient to eliminate the need for the traditional
107
defenses.
There has been, however, no decision in New York on point, and several New York
courts have applied the defense of condonation in separation proceedings apparently
without statutory authorization. See, e.g., Knapp v. Knapp, 273 App. Div. 993, 78
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 660, 87 N.E.2d 57 (1949); Wirth v. Wirth, 184 App.
Div. 643, 172 N.Y.S. 309 (1918); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 9 Abb. R. 35, 36-37 (App.
Div. 1867). One case has expressly noted its judicial origin. See Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 66 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See also FOSTER & FREED § 15:15.
10, See N.Y. Dom.'Ru.. LAw § 171 (MeKinney Supp. 1966); note 107 infra.
105 See, e.g., Matysek v. Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 51, 128 A.2d 627, 631 (1957); Gerdts v.
Gerdts, 196 Minn. 599, 604, 265 N.W. 811, 814 (1936); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12,
18, 41 P.2d 1059, 1060 (1935); Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 86, 127 S.E.2d 889, 890
(1962) (separation which was the result of abandonment, not agreement, is the only
defense); Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 236, 259; 172 A. 323, 324 (1934).
101Cf. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
107 Recrimination is basically the defense that even though the defendant may have
committed a marital offense the plaintiff has also and should not, therefore, be granted
relief. See N.Y Dom. R.L. LAw § 171 (McKinney Supp. 1966); Mohrmann v. Kob, 291
N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943). This defense has been attacked as an unsound application of the equitable clean hands doctrine, for it requires continuation of marriage
the deterioration of which has been doubly demonstrated. See Pullen v. Pullen &
Holding, 123 L.T.R. 203, 206 (1920); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d
366 (1953); Beamer, Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. KAN. Cnry L. REV.
213, 243 (1942); McCurdy, supra note 98, at 694-99; Raskin & Katz, The Dying Doctrine
of Recriminationin the United States, 35 CAN. B. REv. 1046 (1957); Scott, The Doctrine
of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 21 RocKY MT. L. Rav. 407 (1949). There
would, therefore, seem to be no compulsion to allow this defense other than as provided
by statute, and § 171 only provides for the adultery of plaintiff as a recriminatory defense. See Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
Collusion is an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant that defendant will
not contest the action or that the act which will be a ground for divorce will be
committed. See Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Denying divorce
because the defendant agrees not to defend would seem to have little application now
that consent and living apart for two years can be a basis for divorce. The one circumstance in which the collusion doctrine might serve a useful function is in the case
of cruel and inhuman treatment which has no required separation or waiting period,
for the parties will be tempted to avoid the separation or waiting periods by colluding
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Restriction on remarriage by the party at fault has also been
eliminated by the reform law.10 8 Originating in the canon law dogma concerning the indissolubility of a marriage bond, 10 9 restraints on
remarriage were apparently later conceived in part as a punitive
measure. n ° A proposal in the Leaders' Bill that restraints on remarriage be extended to both spouses and be reduced to six months
must have been contemplated as a deterrent to divorce."' The ento establish evidence. However, the objection here is not that there is an agreement
but that the ground itself does not exist. If satisfactory proof is shown as required by
statute, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1966), there appears no reason
to deny relief because of the agreement. Furthermore, if the parties actually collude
for commission of the offense in the case of cruel and inhuman treatment and abandonment, the requisite mental state of the plaintiff is lacking. See DeVide v. DeVide, 186
App. Div. 814, 174 N.Y.S. 774 (1919) (physical violence-no apprehension); Heylmun
v. Heylmun, 119 Misc. 113, 195 N.Y.S. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (mental cruelty-reasonably
intolerable); McBride v. McBride, 56 Hun. 649, 9 N.Y.S. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1890) (physical
violence-no fear). In case of confinement for three years, it seems unlikely that the
parties will collude to have one imprisoned in order to obtain a divorce.
Connivance is corrupt consenting to have the other party commit the marital offense,
Santoro v. Santoro, 55 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 859, 56 N.Y.S.2d 539
(1945), in which case the necessary mental state on the part of the plaintiff, see DeVide
v. DeVide, supra; McBride v. McBride, supra; Heylmun v. Heylmun, supra, would

again be lacking. Since conniving for commission of a crime would itself be a crime
with an appropriate remedy, it seems unnecessary further to sanction the connivance by
forcing continuance of a marriage in which neither party has an interest.
Condonation is the defense that the marital offense has been forgiven. See N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW § 171 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (adultery-affirmative proof of forgiveness
or cohabitation with knowledge); Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige Ch. 108 (N.Y. 1830) (divorce);
FOSTE & FREE §§ 15:15, :16 (separation-subsequent cohabitation raises inference of
condonation). Since the defense tends to penalize the forgiving spouse, FOSTER & FRED
§ 7:10, the courts have established the doctrine of revival under which offenses prior
to the act of forgiveness are revived by subsequent derelictions. See Smith v. Smith, 4

Paige Ch. 432 (N.Y. 1834). In separation cases where condonation is a judicial creation,
Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 66 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1946), courts have given the defense
the force of an inference only. See In re Chandler's Will, 175 Misc. 1029, 26 N.Y.S.2d

280 (Sup. Ct. 1941). It would seem more advisable to treat subsequent acts importing
forgiveness as indicating an absence of the requisite mental state on the part of the
plaintiff in instances of cruel and inhuman treatment and as evidence of previous consent
to separation in instances of abandonment.
103N.Y. Dom. RErL. LAw § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1966) provides that either party to a
divorce may remarry. Under the previous section only the complainant could remarry
without permission of the court, and the court could modify the decree to give permission to the defendant only after three years and on condition of good behavior.
Compare N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1966), with N.Y. Sess. Laws 1909,
ch. 19, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1915, ch. 266, and N.Y. Sess. Laws 1919, ch. 265

(former § 8).

109See notes 9-13 supra.
110See In re Salmon, 34 Misc. 251, 252-53, 69 N.Y.S. 215, 216-17

FOSTE & FREED § 6:16.

(Sup. Ct. 1901);

I'l See First Draft of Leaders' Bill (on file Duke University School of Law Library).
Lichtenberger, writing in 1931, collected evidence that should have raised strong questions concerning deterrence resulting from restrictions on remarriage. He noted that in

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1967: 956

acted bill abandoned this proposal in favor of elimination of all
restraints except during the three month period between the interlocutory decree and final judgment. 112 The rejection of the archaic
restrictions on remarriage was partially motivated by a realization of
the practical ineffectiveness of such limitations insofar as they would
3
not affect subsequent marriages contracted outside of New York."
Although the legislature seems to have sought a compromise
between fault and nonfault principles in providing for grounds and
defenses, in one respect it has gone very far toward complete adoption
of the nonfault principle. If parties separate under the required
recorded agreement or by judicial separation after the effective date
of the statute, there is no way to prevent conversion to divorce by
either party at the end of two years. 114 A person, the stability of
whose marriage is becoming doubtful and who wishes some sort of
binding readjustment of his marital status short of divorce, is not
only deterred from seeking such solutions" 5 but also has very limited
one U.S. study only 12.7% of divorced spouses remarried within one year and that in
another conducted in Switzerland, a country with a similar divorce rate, there was little
difference between the remarriage rate of divorced and widowed spouses. LicHTENaEGR 174. While Lichtenberger's conclusions were tentative because of insufficient
data, current information tends to substantiate his conclusions. Although a very
high percentage of divorced persons eventually remarry, through the mid-1930's the
percentage of remarriage within one year was less than 25% for both males and females.
See JACOBSON 70. Thus, the basic premise upon which restrictions on remarriage are
based-that a person obtains a divorce in order to marry his paramour immediately and
that therefore a delay in ability to so marry will discourage divorce-is undercut. This
conclusion is also supported by one study in which only 6% of the sample indicated
that the cause of their divorce was affection for a nonspouse. See W. GOODE, Arrir
DivoRcE 123 (1956). In fact, Lichtenberger argues that restricing the availability of
divorce procedures might encourage divorce, since persons knowing that they must wait
a period of time before they can remarry might seek an immediate divorce in order to
be eligible for remarriage as soon as possible. LICHTENBERGER 176; 1966 JLC REPORT
104. The effectiveness of the past restrictions in New York was also limited by the
holding that they did not apply to marriages obtained outside the jurisdiction. Fisher
v. Fisher,
250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460 (1929); Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N.Y. 521 (1883).
11
See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 242 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
11
8 See N.Y. DoM. RE.L. LAw § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1966). For cases holding sister
state marriages valid if valid where contracted, see, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313,
165 N.E. 460 (1929); Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N.Y. 521 (1883); Beaudoin v. Beaudoin,
270 App. Div. 631, 62 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1946). When, however, the state of the remarriage
would hold the marriage invalid if it would have had no validity in the state of the
spouses' domicile, then New York will hold it invalid. Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, supra.
See also notes
lz, See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 170 (5), (6) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
151-60 infra and accompanying text.
115A wife might be deterred from converting her separation into absolute divorce
by the prospect of loss of her election and intestate succession rights, for under N.Y.
DEcED. Est. LAw § 50 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966), conversion extinguishes those rights.
Furthermore, if the wife seeks to protect her marital property rights by agreement, she
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alternatives. 116 There is some indication that the significance of
these reform provisions might become even more far-reaching, for
the only decision interpreting the new law, In re Curatolo"7 held
that the statute's conversion provisions can be applied to pre-existing
separations without modification of a decree or re-execution of
agreement. The Attorney General has issued an opinion providing
: 8
for a similar effect. "
The second major reform in the New York system is the establishment of an elaborate conciliation procedure." 9 This machinery
will be administered through a state-financed 120 Conciliation Bureau
located in each judicial district,' 2 1 supervised by a supreme court

justice, 2 2 and staffed by commissioners and counselors appointed by
the supervising justice.1 2s Provisions are included for the appointmay find her husband unwilling to acquiesce, for INT. R-V. CODE OF 1954, § 2516 would
require payment of a gift tax if the agreement were not followed within two years by
divorce. See notes 162-66 infra and accompanying text.
218 Procedures which would not raise the possibility of absolute dissolution of the
marriage seem to be limited to support and custody actions, see N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 240 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr §§ 412, 651 (McKinney 1963), and actions
for separation for a period less than two years, see N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
1"752 Misc. 2d 31, 274 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
218 See Informal Opinion A.G. 1050, Sept. 12, 1966, printed in 156 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26,
1966, at 1, col. 3.
211See generally Note, 4 HARV. J. LGis. 149, 153-59 (1966).
128 See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 215-b (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966). This is one of the
more important provisions of Article 11-B, the article establishing the conciliation
provision, since the county-financed conciliation services in Family Courts have not
been effectively implemented. See 1966 N.Y. Jun. CONF. REP. 309. This is probably
due in part to difficulty in county financing. See Larsen, Trends and Developments in
Oregon Family Law: Court, Counsel, and Conciliation, 43 ORE. L. REv. 97, 104 (1964).
Concern over county financing has resulted in a bill that will be introduced in the
1967 legislature to provide for state financing for all courts. 157 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 5, 1967, at
1, col. 6.
1 1
2 See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1966). This provision has been
strongly criticized as uneconomical, primarily because of the small demand in some
districts, and the administrative organization of the New York courts on the department
rather than the district level. See, e.g., FOSTER & FREED 22; The Report of the Special
Committee on Matrimonial Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(Part I), 156 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1966, at 4 [hereinafter cited as A.B.C.N.Y. Report]; Report
of the Special Committee on Matrimonial Law of the New York County Lawyer's
Association 30-31 (1966) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. County Bar Report].
122 N.Y. DoM. RY_.. LAW § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1966). The New York City and
County Bar Associations recommended an amendment substituting an administrative
official for the supervising justice. A.B.C.N.Y. Report, at 4; N.Y. County Bar Report,
at 31-32.
12
3 N.Y. DoM. R.. LAw § 215-b (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966). Concern has been shown
over the method of compensation and lack of required qualification for the commissioner
and counselor positions. Since the statute specified compensation by fee, it apparently
requires payment at a fixed rate per case rather than set salaries, with the probability
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ment of special guardians to represent the interests of any children. 124
The only jurisdiction granted the Conciliation Bureau is specified in
section 215-a: "The Conciliation Bureau shall have the power to
conduct all conciliation proceedings after the commencement of an
action for divorce.... ." Nothing is said about jurisdiction in separation proceedings. 125 Since Article 9 of the Family Court Act had
already provided for a Family Court conciliation service in any case
in which either spouse petitions for conciliation, 126 the apparent intention of the legislature in its subsequent formation of the Conciliation Bureau was that conciliation rendered by the Family Court
would now be limited to cases falling outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau. Thus, in separation actions, presumably a stage
in marriage breakdown earlier than divorce, conciliation proceedings
are not required, but are available on petition to the Family Court.
After commencement of a divorce action by service of summons, 27 a notice of such commencement must be filed with the
Bureau within ten days or the action will be discontinued. 28 Commencement by summons rather than complaint not only avoids any
objection of denial of speedy access to the courts, 29 but also prevents
of ad hoc appointments which will inhibit development of requisite skills. See
A.B.C.N.Y. Report, at 4; N.Y. County Bar Report, at 31. The role of the conciliation
commissioner is pivotal, since he provides initial contact with the feuding spouses.
However, the only qualification required by statute is that he be an attorney admitted
to practice in New York for at least five years. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 215-b (b)
(McKinney Supp. 1966). Furthermore, no qualifications are listed for counselors. See
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 215-b (McKinney Supp. 1966). However, additional standards
adopted by statute or court rule have been urged. See Address of Professor Henry
H. Foster, Jr., 156 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1966, No. 73, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. County Bar Report,
at 33. Fears of political patronage have also been expressed. See N.Y. County Bar
Report, at 33.
121See N.Y. DoM. REL.. LAw §§ 215-b (a), (d), 215-c (c) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
2
See FosrER & FaRED, Supp. at 22-23.
12 6See N.Y. FAMmY Cr. Aar § 921 (McKinney 1963), implementing N.Y. CONST. art.
6, §1b
(6).
227 See N.Y. Dom. R L LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
2
' SSee N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §215-c (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
229In Illinois, People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill.2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262
(1954), held that forcing a sixty-day waiting period prior to filing was unconstitutional
under the state constitution as a denial of immediate access to the courts. In People
ex reL Doty v. Connell, 9 Ill.2d 390, 137 N.E.2d 849 (1956), a statute requiring a waiting
period between service of summons and filing of a complaint was held constitutional.
That such problems have concerned the legislature is apparent from a JLC memorandum to the governor relative to a statute providing for referrals of spouses on a
voluntary basis to private or county-supported conciliation sessions: "In any event, if
either spouse withdraws his or her consent at any time, the conciliation services cease
and the parties are immediately returned to the Court with their action. This is
necessary because of the Constitutional rule that parties cannot be deprived for an
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exacerbation of the defendant's feelings by an inflammatory complaint. 13 0 Discontinuance of the action for failure to file the requisite
commencement notice is one of the features lending compulsoriness
to conciliation proceedings.
To begin the conciliation procedure, the Bureau's supervising
justice assigns the matter to a conciliation commissioner who, within
five days thereafter, gives notice of the date of a conciliation conference. 31 Another compulsory feature appears at this point in the
form of a power in the supervising justice to order attendance if
either party fails to appear at the conciliation conference. 132 A finding by the commissioner of "no necessity" for further conciliation
proceedings "for good cause shown" can terminate the entire conciliation procedure at this juncture. 33 While the statute gives no
indication of the nature of good cause, it would seem that if the
long separation periods associated with all but two of the statutory
grounds are sufficient indicators of the death of the marriage, additional conciliation procedures, which could last as long as 120 days, 3 4
would be superfluous. However, the legislature apparently intended
counseling as an additional rather than an alternative safeguard
to the separation period, since a finding of "no necessity" was left
unreasonable period of time of the services of our Judicial system." 1966 JLC REPORT
37 (emphasis added). See generally Brooklyn Law Review Study, 1958 JLC REPORT 129.
210 See Lawless, Compulsory Conciliation for New York?, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 457,
462 (1965); cf. Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce: The Social
Problem and What Lawyers Can Do About It, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 451, 466-67 (1965).
See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.001 (Supp. 1965).
1-' See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 215-c (b) (McKinney Supp. 1966). Section 215-c (b) (1)
also permits at this point the appointment of a special guardian for any minor, handicapped, or incompetent children.
122 See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 215-c (b) (3) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
See also N.Y.
FAMILY CT. Aar § 92 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1966), which contains a similar procedure
that is not automatic but requires a request by the spouse seeking aid of the Family
Court conciliation service before attendance will be compelled.
111 N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 215-c (b) (2) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
13' No action for divorce can be tried until the commissioner submits his final report,
or 120 days after the filing of notice with the Bureau. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 215-g
(McKinney Supp. 1966). In addition, no verified complaint, which includes all complaints except those alleging adultery, may be served in a divorce or separation until
120 days after service of summons. N.Y. Dos. REL. LAW § 211 (McKinney Supp.
1966). The requirement of a 120 day waiting period in separation actions has been
soundly criticized because of the absence of any conciliation requirement in separation
actions. "[This provision] . . . is patently a typographical error which should be eliminated. A compulsory delay of 120 days between the service of a summons in a separation action and the filing of a complaint has never been suggested by anybody." The
Report of the Special Committee on MatrimonialLaw of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (Pt. II), 156 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1966, at 4.
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completely discretionary and was not in any way correlated to
specific grounds.1,35 Nevertheless, causes which seemingly should
be sufficient to render conciliation unnecessary include prior unsuccessful counseling by approved counselors, particularly a prior
failure of reconciliation by the Family Court, and unavailability of
one spouse, as in a suit based on abandonment or imprisonment.
If a finding of no necessity cannot be justified, the commissioner
is directed to hold an informal conference to determine if the
parties are to be referred to counselors. 36 Since attendance at these
counseling sessions may be compelled, whether such counseling is
made mandatory is within the combined discretion of the commissioner and the supervising justice. 137 Within thirty days after the
report of the counselor, the conciliation commissioner may hold a
conciliation hearing at which each party is entitled to be heard,
present evidence, cross-examine, and be represented by counsel. 138
The primary purpose of this post-counseling hearing is, according
to the statute, to determine if a sixty-day reconciliation period
should be ordered. 139 After this final hearing if the commissioner
reports that reconciliation is not possible, statutory procedures are
141
at an end, 140 and the plaintiff may file his complaint.
The legislature also passed a provision apparently aimed at interstate evasion by migratory divorce. 42 This provision, adopted from
Section 2 of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, is in the form
of a presumption of domicile within New York in cases where a
party obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction was domiciled in
New York within twelve months prior to the decree and returns to
New York within eighteen months after departure. Domicile is also
presumed if at all times between departure and return a place of
43
residence has been maintained within New York.
LIMITS OF THE REFORM

Within the context of the history of divorce law and the present
status of that law, the New York reform is not a unique departure.
181See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 215-c (b) (2) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
"Id. § 215-c (b) (4).

20

237 See id.

...Id. § 215-d.
139
See id. § 215-d (e).
140 Id.
11 Id. §215-g (1).

"4 See N.Y. DoM. R ... LAw § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
113 See notes 218-41 infra and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, serious weakness can be found in the statutory structure finally adopted. Compromise of nonfault, nonadversary policies
with traditional concepts of divorce law has resulted in a system
which leaves uncertain whether separation as a basis for divorce
applies only when the spouses live apart subsequent to the enactment
of the present statute and to fulfillment of filing requirements. The
compromise has also created intrastate evasionary devices which
encourage the self-defeat of many of the motivations for the reforms.
Further, the recently articulated constitutional right to marital
privacy raises doubts as to the validity of the conciliation procedure
adopted. Finally, the jurisdiction of the courts has been restricted in
an attempt to limit recognition of sister state decrees.
Compromise of Policies. Of the basic policy decisions represented by the new reform, several represent compromises between
traditional principles of divorce and current trends toward nonfault
grounds and nonadversary proceedings. In one compromise the
legislature chose not to rely exclusively on a nonadversary, family
court as the tribunal rendering divorce decisions. Although New
York has a family court which handles most family-oriented problems,'1 44 divorce proceedings have been left in the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court,'14 5 the court of general jurisdiction in New York.
As a further compromise, the Supreme Court procedure is designed
to be partly adversary and partly nonadversary in nature. Since a
mandatory conciliation procedure is interposed before the trial of
the divorce action, a situation is created in which the objectives of
each procedure may be defeated by the other. Feuding parties may
be discouraged from sincere attempts at reconciliation by the
prospect that cooperation in the conciliation sessions might reveal
information or strategy which would handicap the prosecution of
their case at trial. 146 On the other hand, since most cases will be
tried by a judge who will be aware that conciliation has already been
found impossible or unnecessary, there will exist an unconscious
pressure to allow dissolution of a marriage the further success of
47
which appears doubtful.1
'"See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 13; N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
'"Compare N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 13, with N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
146 See notes 183-84 infra and accompanying text.
247 New York judges in the past have gone to extremes to allow dissolution of marriage by annulment for fraud in order to mitigate a restrictive divorce law. See note 72
supra.
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country, 14

As have other jurisdictions in this
New York stopped
short of adoption of nonfault grounds exclusively. 149 Unfortunately,
the linking of delays with those grounds not based in culpability
may promote undesirable results. When the potential petitioner
views the protraction necessitated by the combination of a possible
120 day conciliation period and the pre-existing three month interlocutory period, the availability of alternative fault grounds which
do not impose the additional delay of a separation period may provide
incentive for avoidance of the nonfault grounds. 15 0
Retroactive Effect of Separation Grounds. The states adopting
separation periods which have decided the retroative effect of the
statute have almost unanimously held such provisions applicable
to pre-existing separations.' 5 ' Of course, these decisions, based on
interpretations of particularized statutes, are not necessarily precedent for a similar interpretation of the New York statute. 52 How5 3 would
ever, a New York Supreme Court case, In re Curatolo,1
allow retroactive application of the new separation agreement and
separation decree provisions. The court in Curatolo based its holding on legislative intent discerned from the inclusion of an express
disclaimer of retroactive effect in the original proposal of the Joint
Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Law and the absence of such a limitation in the bill as passed. 5 4 However, this
interpretation is at variance with statements by the principal
drafter in response to questions on the floor of the legislature, 155
1

2 8 See notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text. Both nonfault separation periods
and the strictly fault grounds of cruelty and adultery were adopted.
20 For the effect of alternative fault grounds without a separation period, see note 57
supra and accompanying text.
151 Separation for period: Rozboril v. Rozboril, 60 Ariz. 247, 135 P.2d 221 (1943);
White v. White, 196 Ark. 29, 116 S.W.2d 616 (1938); State ex rel. Progress v. First
Judicial Dist. Court, 53 Nev. 386, 2 P.2d 129 (1931); Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139
S.E.2d 821 (1965); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.08.020 (Supp. 1965); Wis. Laws 1925, ch. 4,
repealed by, Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 595, § 52, presently, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (7) (Supp.
1967). Separation under judicial decree: Fuqua v. Fuqua, 268 Ala. 17, 104 So. 2d 925
(1958); Gerdts v. Gerdts, 196 Minn. 599, 265 N.W. 811 (1936); Wis. Laws 1925, ch. 4,
repealed by, Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 595, § 52, presently, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (7) (Supp.
1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (Supp. 1966) (necessary implication), But see Pierce
v. Pierce, 107 Wash. 125, 128-31, 181 P. 24, 25-26 (1919).
152 See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjuy, 52 VA. L. Rav. 32, 8081 (1966).
153 52 Misc.2d 31, 274 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1966); accord, Informal Opinion A.G.
1050, Sept. 12, 1966, printed in 156 N.Y.LJ., Oct. 26, 1966, at 1, col. 2.
15
In re Curatolo, 52 Misc. 2d 31, 274 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
155
See FOSTER & FPE.D, Supp. at 15.
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and disregards as "merely evidentiary" the requirement that separation agreements need be recorded within thirty days of their
making. 15 6 Furthermore, since the conversion feature arguably
applies only to a spouse who accepts a separation agreement with
knowledge of the possibility of conversion, it is rather anomalous to
apply it to spouses who, because of lack of such knowledge, could
not have been consented to conversion. The ambiguity seems to
necessitate legislative clarification. However, contentions that retroactive application would be void as a violation of due process should
have only negligible inhibitory effect upon judicial or legislative
action to affirm such application. 157 While retroactivity might be
viewed as an unconstitutional taking of property since a wife's interest in her husband's estate is terminated by divorce, 158 the United
States Supreme Court has upheld a New York termination provision as a valid exercise of legislative power. 5 9 Any allegation that
mere separation is an inadequate justification for imposing the
disabilities accompanying divorce would have to overcome the precedential significance of decisions in other jurisdictions dismissing
similar challenges. 160
Intrastate Evasion. The effectiveness of the reform law seems
certain to be impaired by intrastate evasionary devices. The reform
structure not only established new incentives for evading the statutory provisions but also left old evasionary devices untouched. Under the old law the impetus for evasion of the divorce law came
from its restrictiveness. While this incentive has been mitigated by
the more liberal grounds, there are several factors which might motivate avoidance of the most significant of the innovations-separation period grounds and conciliation procedures.

115 N.Y. DoM.

REL. LAw § 170 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
l57Note, 12 N.Y.L.F. 105, 108 (1966). For a brief summary of the relegation of
economic due process arguments to the states, see R. POWELL, RFAL PROPERTY
754-55
(1962). See generally Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and
Legislative Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1960).
1s8See note 115 supra.
151In referring to the statutory elective share of a wife in her husband's estate, the
New York Court of Appeals stated: "Since rights of descent and distribution of a
decedent's estate axe created by the law of the State, the State may change or take
away such rights .... ." In re McGlone's Will, 284 N.Y. 527, 533, 32 N.E.2d 539, 542
(1940), aff'd, 314 U.S. 556 (1941).
160 See Fuqua v. Fuqua, 268 Ala. 127, 104 So. 2d 925 (1958); Rozboril v. Rozboril, 60
Ariz. 247, 135 P.2d 221 (1943); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933);
Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
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Economic considerations might discourage suit for a separation
decree by an "injured" spouse. Part of the leverage in bargaining
for a property settlement results from the fact that even after a
judicial separation decree, an "innocent" spouse retains her election
and inheritance rights in the "guilty" spouse's estate. However, a
conversion into a divorce would terminate those rights.1 61 Thus,
the possibility of conversion deters the "innocent" spouse from seeking a separation until a property settlement agreement is made.
An incentive to avoid the separation agreement ground, at least
for persons in the middle and upper income brackets, is found in
the federal gift tax law. 10 2 Under the separation period provisions
of other states, no formal agreement is required to begin the running of the statutory period; 163 but under New York law, the commencement of the period is not recognized unless such an agreement
is recorded within thirty days of its execution. 64 If separation agreement property settlements are followed within two years by divorce, 165 Internal Revenue Code, section 2516, presumes them to
have been made for adequate consideration and thereby renders them
exempt from the gift tax. 66 Thus, under the New York statute requiring a two year separation period after a written separation agreement, the gift tax provision will be very difficult to satisfy. Although
it seems both that the recorded separation agreement requirement
of the divorce law could be satisfied by an agreement which did not
provide for a property settlement 67 and that any property settlement
261 See note 115 supra.
182 Incompatibility with the gift tax was first noted by a study committee of the
New York Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, see N.Y. Times,

Dec. 5, 1966, § 1, at 64, col. 1, a group with a vested interest in tax protection of

wealthy clients. Under current gift tax rates, a husband transferring residential property worth $23,000 would have to pay taxes up to $1,200, depending on the extent to
which the specific exemption of § 2521 had been depleted. See INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 2502, 2503.
"2' See authorities cited note 41 supra.
16, N.Y. DoM. Ra,. LAw § 170 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
118Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1 (a) (1961) interprets divorce to mean "final decree." This
interpretation should be considered in any revision of the' separation period since
New York employs a three month interlocutory decree procedure. See N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAw § 242 (McKinney 1963).
'"6 If a settlement is made in appreciated property, the "donor" is subject to an
income tax irrespective of his liability under the gift tax provi,ions. See United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962); Farid-Es-Sultaneh, 160 F.2d 812, 814-15 (2d Cir.
1947).
107Although the issue is not free from doubt, it appears that satisfaction of § 2516
is not necessary to exempt settlement of support as opposed to property rights from
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could be postponed until within two years of a final divorce decree,
such an arrangement is highly unlikely as a practical matter. The
only motive for an agreement without property settlement would be
to gain a tax advantage for the prospective donor, a factor hardly
compelling consent by the prospective donee. Further, if the latter
accepts such an agreement, she loses her leverage in bargaining for
a property settlement since the agreement, even without a property
settlement, would give rise to conversion rights in the prospective
donor. In order for the separation period grounds to attain the
objectives intended by their promulgations, it would seem that the
legislature must correct the conflict between the federal and state
provisions by either removing the recording requirement or shortening the separation period.
Strong incentives also exist for evasion of the conciliation procedures. Although there will be those who generally object to the
idea of counseling, the extent of such attitudes is unknown. More
troublesome, however, are the potentially significant expense and
delay engendered by the increased number of hearings inherent in
the conciliation procedure. 6" For the poor, there is the prospect of
additional attorney's fees, 169 for not only will an attorney probably
appear at the divorce trial, but the two or more additional hearings
in connection with conciliation may also require his presence. 70
Such added expense could discourage spouses from initiating divorce
proceedings or encourage contrived abandonments which would
probably result in an early termination of conciliation through a finding of "no hecessity."' 7 ' Further, the separation period required for
abandonment could be avoided if divorce on grounds of cruelty were
72
sought.
The more affluent, for whom fault grounds are usually either
distasteful or unavailable, and for whom conciliation engenders too
much delay, can resort to migratory divorce as an alternative to the
intrastate devices. The possibility of a conciliation period which
might last 120 days followed by a three month interlocutory period
the gift tax. See 1946-2 Cum. BuLL. 166; Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 CUM. BuLL. 374;
Estate of Robert Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323, 335 (1966).
268 See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
I"' See Report of the Special Committee on Matrimonial Law, 21 THE REcoRD OF
THE A sOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 590 (1966).
170

See notes 127-41 supra and accompanying text.

171 See text following note 133 supra.

7 See notes 95-100 supra and accompanying text.
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has little appeal when compared to a sojourn of six weeks in Las
Vegas, 173 and divorces of the one day variety in Mexico which might
still be valid in New York. 7 4 Even if a party is not motivated to
avoid conciliation, incentive nevertheless exists for non-cooperation
during counseling sessions. If the divorce action will be actually
contested, the conciliation process may lead to revelations that will
be harmful to a spouse's case in the subsequent adversary proceeding. 7 5 The harshness of this possibility is partially avoided in most
jurisdictions having conciliation procedures by restrictions upon
admissibility of information revealed in conferences. 7 6 However,
New York provides only that the records are to be confidential and
their availability restricted to parties, their attorneys, and the staff
of the Conciliation Bureau. 7 7 While revelation to the counselor is
arguably privileged under a New York statute granting a limited
privilege to certified social workers and psychologists, 78 there is no
specific statutory requirement that these counselors be so cate79
gorized.
Right to Privacy. The right to privacy in the private law context is a relatively new concept, having been established as an independent right of action during the present century. 80 Various
aspects of such a right find expression in the specific provisions of
the first ten amendments of the federal constitution. However, it
was not until Griswoldv. Connecticut,'8 ' which held unconstitutional
a Connecticut statute which had been construed as prohibiting the
use of contraceptives in marital intercourse, that the right to privacy
1t3 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020
3.74 See

(1963).

notes 74-75 supra.
17 While only about ten percent of divorces are actually contested, see note 44
supra, a lawyer may find it difficult not to react negatively to any revelation which
could potentially endanger his case.
176
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1747 (West Supp. 1967) (treated as official information); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-5-6 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 107.600 (2), (3) (1965);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.081 (Supp. 1967). Indeed New York itself has such a provision
in reference to its family court conciliation procedure. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 915
(McKinney 1963).
177 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 215-f (McKinney Supp. 1966).
118 See N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 7611, 7710 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
118 See note 123 supra.
180Warren and Brandeis first conceived of such a right in 1890. The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Today more than thirty jurisdictions recognize
such a right by court decision or statute. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112, at 831-32 (3d
ed. 1964). See generally S. HOFSTADTER & G. HoRowITz, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1964).
181381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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was recognized in the public law context. On the basis of this
limited precedent it has been suggested that the right to privacy may
be invaded by a compulsory conciliation procedure such as that en1 82
acted by New York.
There are three compulsory features of the reform that must be
examined in order to assess the constitutionality of the New York
procedure. First, a party is compelled to notify the Conciliation
Bureau of the filing of the divorce petition under penalty of dismissal. Second, after notification of the Conciliation Bureau, a party
may be compelled by court order, backed by the contempt power, to
appear for a conciliation conference with a concilation commissioner.
Finally, at the discretion of the commissioner or a conciliation
counselor, spouses may even be ordered to attempt reconciliation for
sixty days.18 3 Yet, since a party's action for divorce can be stayed
for only a maximum of 120 days, the provision for use of court
orders to compel attendance and attempts at reconciliation is, in
reality, the primary compulsory element of the procedure. It should
be noted that at the counseling stage the parties are only compelled
to appear; there is nothing in the statute which requires cooperation or communication with counselors in any manner. The orders
to compel attempts at reconciliation for sixty days do appear, how84
ever, to require a semblance of cooperation.
Since the basis of the right of privacy is unclear' 8 5 and its standard
of application unsettled, 8 6 an analysis of New York's complex divorce
procedure by constitutional standards is speculative indeed. Nonetheless, it appears that the standard is to be a balancing test, 8 7 with
2 See Foster, Divorce Law, 156 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1966, at 1, 4, col. 7; N.Y. County
Bar Report, at 36; A.B.C.N.Y. Report, at 3.
118N.Y. DoM. RrL. LAW § 215-d (e) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
281 "If ... the commissioner shall find that reconciliation is possible and would best
serve the interest of both parties to the marriage, and any children thereof, the commissioner shall . . . apply for an order . . . requiring the parties, for a period not
to exceed sixty days, to attempt to effect a reconciliation." N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW
§ 215-d (e) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
185 Although the opinion in Griswold is concerned with the basis of the right in
the penumbra surrounding the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, 381
U.S. at 484-85, the separate concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Goldberg and Mr. Justice
Harlan make more clear the dichotomy between the selective incorporation approach to
substantive due process and Harlan's thesis that substantive due process includes those
rights fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty without necessity for reference to
the Bill of Rights. Id. at 488, 499-500. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 228-31 (1965); Note, 1966 DUKE L.J. 562, 569-71.
186See Emerson, supra note 185, at 230-31; Note, 1966 DUKE L.J. 562, 566-69.
187 Although the opinion of the court in Griswold seems to rely solely on the undue
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the burden on the state to show a "subordinating" and "compelling"
interest.las Thus, the initial step must be to determine if the individual's interest falls within the scope of the right to privacy. The
Griswold holding, the only one to recognize privacy as an independent, constitutionally based right, is rather narrowly restricted to
the facts before the Court which dealt only with the privacy of marital
intercourse.1 9 Nevertheless, there is language in the several
opinions of the majority which hints that the scope of the right protected is to be rather wide, 9 0 and extend to aspects of the marital
relationship other than sexual intimacies. 1'0
Considering first compelled attendance at conferences, one could
argue that a logical extension of the Griswold right to marital
privacy includes freedom from nonconsensual surveillance of intibreadth of the Connecticut statute, 381 U.S. at 485-86, Mr. Justicc Goldberg, joined in
a concurring opinion by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, id. at 497, and
Mr. Justice White's concurrence in the judgment, id. at 504, employ a balancing test.
See Emerson, supra note 185, at 230-31.
1" 381 U.S. at 497, 504. Since the divorce remedy is entirely statutory and it appears
that a state might entirely deny the remedy, see notes 28-30 supra and accompanying
text, it would seem, by analogy to the procedural due process cases involving public
employees, that the state might reasonably condition the remedy, see United Public
Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947). However, the condition must
not be arbitary or discriminatory. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551,
555 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). Although the extent of
the burden on the state may vary according to the nature of the rights involved, see
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), this burden of justification does not seem
to be as great as that necessary to sustain the Griswold result in favor of private litigants. It therefore would appear that if the Griswold criteria can be satisfied, the
procedural due process requirements would necessarily be satisfied also. The conclusion
below that the conciliation statute will probably stand in the absence of a demonstrated
pattern of abuse even under the Griswold standards, see notes 205-09 infra and accompanying text, renders unnecessary any effort to designate preciselh the scope of the
state's burden in defending its alleged invasion of privacy.
See generally Beaney, The Right to Privacy and
's See 381 U.S. at 482, 485.
American Law, 31 Lw & CONTENIP. PROB. 253 k1966); Emerson, supra note 176, at 23133; Wqestin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposalsfor the 1970's (pt. II),
66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1205, 1239-52 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Westin (II)].
29oThe Court had previously held that freedom of association was a peripheral first
amendment right, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1957), but in Griswold the Court aggregates zones of privacy created
by several constitutional guarantees and finds it unnecessary to relate the particular right
to a specific guarantee, see 381 U.S. at 484-85.
1" The term "relation" is frequently employed by the Court and nowhere defined,
but the Court concludes: "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights . . . Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred." 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added). Mr.
Justice Goldberg also indicates greater breadth when he says, "'. . the rights to marital
privacy and to marr% and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specificall protected." Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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19 2

mate relations.
Furthermore, both recent congressional investiga94
tions into psychological testing 93 and reactions of commentators
indicate support for extension of the right of privacy to include protection against nonconsensual psychological surveillance generally.
If, as has been suggested, psychological testing and polygraph tests
are means of "psychological surveillance,"' 9 5 interviews with psychologists would also seem to qualify as surveillance. Freedom from
nonconsensual submission to such sessions could thus be said to be
within the scope of the right to privacy. There would seem to be
doubt, however, as to whether compulsory attendance at conciliation conferences in practice results in nonconsensual interviews that
might be called "psychological surveillance," since rather extensive
experience in compelling attendance at conciliation in other jurisdictions indicates no abuse which has resulted in a reported case.
Even if it is assumed that some abuses will occur, against this
risk must be balanced the interest of the state in the preservation
of the family unit.9 " Although the Supreme Court has given great
weight to the governmental interest in this area in the past, 97 the
procedure adopted to promote stable family units must be considered
See Beaney, supra note 189, at 257-58.
103 See Hearings on Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965
Hearings]; Creech, Psychological Testing and Constitutional Rights, 1966 DUKE L.J.
332, 366-68. Particular concern has been expressed over the possibility of revealing
aspects of a subject's personality that he does not desire to reveal and is unaware he is
revealing. See 1965 Hearings (Testimony of Mr. Freedman, 344-50); Creech, supra
at 366-68. Much of the criticism is directed at the validity of the tests themselves and
not the approach of psychology generally, see 1965 Hearings (Testimony of Mr. Gross,
63-90); Creech, supra at 350-58, a criticism that would tend not to apply to conciliation
where reliance on testing is minimal, see 1965 Hearings (Testimony of Mr. Macy,
36-55).
19See L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 459-60 (2d ed. 1960);
Creech, The Privacy of Government Employees, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 413, 419
(1966); Emerson, supra note 185, at 232-33; Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behaviorial
Research, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 1184, 1199-1203 (1965); Westin (II), at 1221-22.
199See Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's
(pt. 1), 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1003, 1047 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Westin (I)]; Westin
(11), at 1221-22.
10 See note 32 supra. The state has regulatory power commensurate with its interest in the marital relationship. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 569 (1906);
In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942). One state, South Carolina,
exercised this power by prohibiting divorce until 1949. Compare S.C. CONsT. art.
XIV, § 5 (1868), with S.C. CONsT. art. XVII, § 3 (1895), as amended (1949).
197 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
102
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alternatives. 19 8

in light of available
The most viable alternatives
appear to be either a provision requiring the consent of at least one
spouse' 0 9 or a compulsory "screening" procedure. 200 Requiring consent of one of the parties reduces the potential for invasion of privacy
since one spouse has already indicated willingness to discusss intimate
relations by his petitioning for assistance. However, this approach
is apparently not as effective in preserving marriages as the Wisconsin compulsory screening system. When Wisconsin shifted from
a procedure based on consent to one based on compulsory screening,
the number of divorce proceedings abandoned increased by nine percent. 201 The compulsory screening procedure has been proposed as
an alternative to the New York procedure because it purportedly infringes less on the dignity of the individual. 20 2 Such a distinction
is illusory, for the only significant difference between the New York
and Wisconsin procedures is that while the New York statute expressly provides for compulsion by use of the contempt power,203
Wisconsin commissioners lack such a specific grant.20 4 Also, even
a procedure specifically providing that a screening before a commissioner could be compelled, although a counseling session with a
trained counselor could not, would make the distinction turn on the
counseling ability of the interviewer. Thus, there appearing no
realistically distinguishable, equally effective alternative to compulsory counseling, determination of the constitutionality of the
New York statute is relegated to a balancing of the interests of the
individual against the policies of the state as evidenced by present
statutory provisions.
The Supreme Court, until recently, has been reluctant to attempt
the difficult balancing required in the area of social welfare. Prior to
Griswold, the Court had relied on the issue of standing to dispose of
two appeals under the same Connecticut statute.205 There are also
198See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); cf. NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
199See CALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1772 (West Supp. 1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AaT § 921
(McKinney 1963).
200 See notes 54, 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
201See Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 353, 359 (1966).
202
See id. at 380-81; Foster, Divorce Law, 156 N.Y.L.J. Oct. 14, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
20 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 215-c (b) (3) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
204 The Wisconsin commissioners are granted the general power to hold in contempt
for disobedience of any order. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.15 (Supp. 1966).
205 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
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indications that the Court, when it undertook the requisite balancing,
gave much deference to expressed state policies, especially when these
were widely implemented. For example, the Court was willing to
accept administrative searches without warrants20 6 and to condone
the denial of criminal procedural protections to juveniles.20 7 However, in addition to the Griswold invasion of state policies, the
Court has recently stringently applied constitutional standards to
both searches by administrative personnel 208 and juvenile court procedures.20 9 Yet, as to both of these recent developments, patterns of
abuse had been shown. Therefore, it may be doubted whether anything less than a systematic abuse will suffice to invalidate the New
York type compulsory conciliation procedure.
Jurisdiction. The legislature has not only failed to grant all of
the divorce jurisdiction which would be constitutionally permissible,
but has also restricted previously existing jurisdictional criteria.
Formerly, jurisdiction of an action for divorce was granted if both
parties were domiciled within the state when the "fault" leading to
the disunion occurred, 210 if the plaintiff were a domiciliary at the
time of the offense and the commencement of the action, if the
offense occurred in the state and the injured party were a domiciliary
when the action commenced; or if the parties were married in the
state.2 1 1

Now, only if both parties are domiciliaries and the cause

of action arose within the state is jurisdiction granted without a
required period of residence. If the above conditions are not met,
201See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959); Beaney, supra note 189, at 264-65.
207 The Supreme Court did not take its first juvenile delinquency case until seventy
years after the founding of the first juvenile delinquency court. See Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1965 Sup. CT. REY. 167.
208 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
20
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), rev'g 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
210 The former section and the provision of the reform law granting jurisdiction
are phrased in terms of "residence." Compare N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, c. 313, § 7, with
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1966). However, residence has been interpreted to mean domicile. De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N.Y. 485, 24 N.E. 996 (1890).
211N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, c. 313, § 7, repealed by, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, c. 254, § 2.
The jurisdictional bases for separation and annulment differed slightly. In those
actions, jurisdiction existed if both parties were domicilaries; if the parties were
married within the state and one party were a domiciliary when the action was commenced; or when the parties were married without the state, if one party had been
a resident for one year. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, c. 313, § 10, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws
1963, c. 685, § 3 (now N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1966)).
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and if there has been substantial contact with the state by the marriage, or cause for divorce or residence as man and wife within the
state, then the waiting period is one year. Otherwise, the required
period of residence is two years. 212 All of these New York jurisdictional bases exceed the minimum contact-the domicile of one
party within the state-required for recognition under the full faith
213
and credit clause.

Legitimate needs would seem to dictate that New York take a
more liberal view of divorce jurisdiction than that currently represented by the reform statute. For instance, several other states have
sought to expand jurisdiction with regard to military personnel, who
may be resident in a state for an extended period but may not qualify
as domiciliaries because of a lack of requisite intent to remain in
the state. 21 4 Although New York cases indicate no great problem in
the past, the presence of 41,115 military personnel in the state at
the time of the 1960 census

21 5

foreshadows difficulties under the cur-

rent statutory reform. However, even assuming the constitutionality
of extensions such as special jurisdictional criteria for military
personnel, 21 6 any alteration of current standards is unlikely in the
absence of amendment of the new section purporting to limit recognition of out-of-state decrees; for the scope of New York divorce
222N.Y. Dom. REL LAW § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1966).

21

8See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 298-99, 303 (1942).
Whether
less contact than domicile will satisfy the full faith and credit clause is a matter of
controversy. See E. CHEATHAM, E. GRISWOLD, W. REASE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES ON
CONFLICT OF LAws 855-57

(5th ed. 1964); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS

238-42

(1962); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAwS 256, 258 (Scoles ed. 1964).
2 See Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964); Mills v. Mills, 153
Fla. 746, 15 So. 2d 763 (1943); Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace
v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4 (1953); OxLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (Supp. 1966).
2 General Social and Economic Characterisitcs-New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS
OF POPULATION, Table 52 (1960).
216 In Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1947), a Virgin Island statutory presumption of domicile from six weeks residence was held unconstitutional as a violation
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Other language has also indicated
that domicile is a prequisite of jurisdiction. See Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 178
(1901). Such decisions have been employed to restrict special jurisdictional statutes for
military personnel. See Martin v. Martin, 253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961). Yet,
at least one state has expressly found such a status to be a reasonable basis for jurisdiction. See Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 416, 320 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1958); cf.
David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Furthermore, New York courts have expressly held in cases involving decrees of foreign
countries that a valid domicile was not always requisite to recognition. See Rosenstiel
v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 707 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966);
notes 226-28 infra and accompanying text.

Vol. 1967: 956]

DIVORCE REFORM

jurisdiction was apparently 21constricted
in order to be consistent with
7
the new recognition policy.
Extraterritorial Evasion.

The delay of the conciliation pro-

cedure and, for those not wishing to resort to fault grounds, the delay
of long separation periods may furnish an incentive for migratory
divorce. 218 Apparently in anticipation of such an eventuality, the
legislature enacted a provision intended to limit extraterritorial
evasion:
Proof that a person obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction
was (a) domiciled in this state within twelve months prior to the
commencement of the proceeding therefor, and resumed residence
in this state within eighteen months after the date of his departure
therefrom, or (b) at all times after his return maintained a place
of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the
in this state when the divorce proceeding
person was domiciled
2 19
was commenced.
However, the practical effect of section 250 is uncertain: the presumption of domicile in New York as against the granting state
raises constitutional questions under the full faith and credit clause,
while the reliance on presumed domicile may render the section
ineffective as an attempt to prevent recognition of foreign country
220
decrees.
Any decree which qualifies under the full faith and credit clause
must be given the same effect in sister states as would be given in
To conclude that the legislature
217 See notes 218-20 infra and accompanying text.
attempted to make the jurisdictional statute and the foreign decree recognition sections
harmonious requires one to ignore dissimilarities in the wording of the two sections.
Jurisdiction is based on "residence" while recognition is based on "domicile." Compare
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1966), with N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 250
(McKinney Supp. 1966). There is no doubt, however, that in light of relevant precedent, residence in the jurisdictional clause will be interpreted as domicile. See note
210 supra and accompanying text.
218 There are no statistics indicating that procedures such as those adopted in New
York result in increased migration. Wisconsin is the only state with a comprehensive
divorce law structure similar to that now adopted by New York. The law when
adopted in Wisconsin apparently resulted in no significant effect in the migratory
divorce, since the rate of divorces granted in Wisconsin courts actually rose from
STATES 11;
1.6 to 1.8 per thousand. See 1965 STATISTICAL ABsRACr OF THE UNimT
1959 REPORT WIS. JUD. COUNCIL J-46; 1963 REPORT WIS. JUD. COUNCIL 7. However,
the effect in New York may be entirely different because of the pre-existing pattern
of migratory divorce, and the incentives for evasion generally that remain. See notes
168-171 supra and accompanying text.
219N.Y. Doma. REL. LAW § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
22 See FOSTER & FaEED, Supp. at 82-33; A.B.C.N.Y. Report, at 4.
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222
the state where rendered,221 if jurisdictional requirements are met.
It is settled that courts in the domicile of either one of the parties
have jurisdiction to grant a decree which will be entitled to such
credit. 2 23 However, in an ex parte proceeding where the defendant
does not appear and have the opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional
facts, a recital of jurisdiction may be attacked in a forum which
would also have had power to hear the case.224 If both parties appear
or are represented and there is an opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issue, resolution of that issue is res judicata as between the

litigants and as to any third party who would be so barred in the
225
rendering state.
From the above, it appears that section 250 could have no application to bilateral sister state decrees since res judicata precludes any
relitigation in which the presumption might be applied. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina (II),220
an ex parte decree case, stated: "The burden of undermining the
verity which the [sister state] ... decrees import rests heavily upon the
assailant." Since this statement appears in an exposition of the scope
of the full faith and credit clause, that clause apparently requires
221 "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1. See Harding v.
Harding, 198 U.S. 317 (1905).
222 "[T]he Clause does not make a sister-State judgment a judgment in another
State. . . . 'To give it the force of a judgment in another state, it must be made a
judgment there' ....
It can be made a judgment there only if the court purporting
to render the original judgment had power to render such a judgment.... had jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment." Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S.
226, 229 (1945).
323 See Williams v. North Carolina (1), 317 U.S. 287, 298-99, 303 (1942). Whether
domicile is necessary, as well as sufficient, for jurisdiction is a question that has been
left open by the Supreme Court. See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. I
(1955); Comment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 584, 592 (1966). See generally Griswold, Divorce

Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARv. L.

REV. 193 (1951); Comment, 39 CoRNEL L.Q. 293 (1954).
221"As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicile, upon which depends
the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion of such
judicial authority, in another State but seriously affected by it has a right, when
asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of that
crucial fact." Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945). As to limitation2 of this principle to ex parle decrees, see note 231 infra.
1 5 See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 582, 589 (1951) (appearance by attorney
bars collateral attack by third parties if barred by rendering state); Coe v. Coe, 334
U.S. 378, 384 (1948) (res judicata whether or not domicile actually litigated); Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1948) (res judicata if party appears and has opportunity to be heard).
226 325 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1945).

Vol. 1967: 956]

DIVORCE REFORM

993

that the burden of proof be placed on the party attacking the validity
of a decree. However, section 250 places the burden on the party
asserting the validity of the sister state decree under the listed circum2 27
stances and as such would be repugnant to the Williams directive..
It can, therefore, be concluded that in all cases involving sister state
decrees, section 250 would probably be either ineffective or invalid if
applied. This, however, does not mean that the section is invalid on
its face. The section is taken from the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act § 2, and the drafters of that act specifically provide that it is
2 28
intended to occupy only a constitutionally permissible area
There remains to be determined the effect of section 250 in cases
involving decrees granted by jurisdictions outside of the United
States, for such judgments are not covered by the full faith and credit
clause. Recognition of such foreign country decrees is determined
In applying this doctrine
by comity, a policy-based doctrine. 22
230
of Appeals of New York
v.
Rosenstiel,
the
Court
in Rosenstiel
held that domicile was not the only possible basis for divorce jurisdiction and that no policy of the State of New York prevented recognition of the two Mexican divorces before the court, which were

valid where rendered. 231 This decision followed a long line of New
York decisions extending comity to foreign country decrees. 232 Thus,
227

FOSTER & FREED, Supp. at 30.

See § 2, Comment (a).
See Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
230 16 N.Y.2d 64, 73, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (1965), cert. denied,
583 U.S. 943 (1966).
2 1
3 Id. at 74, 209 N.E.2d at 713,'262 N.Y.S.2d at 91. One of the actions considered
in Rosenstiel was based only on submission to personal jurisdiction. In the other,
minimal Mexican residence requirements had been satisfied. Id. at 70, 74, 209 N.E.2d
at 710, 713, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 88, 91.
The liberality of the New York courts in recognizing decrees rendered in foreign
countries has not extended to judgments resulting from ex parte proceedings. See
Gorie v. Gorie, 26 App. Div. 2d 368, 274 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1966); Maltese v. Maltese, 32
Misc. 2d 993, 224 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Johnson v. Johnson, 13 Misc. 2d 891, 181
N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 51 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1944). However, in one case a New York court came very close to recognizing such decrees. In
Cannon v. Phillips, 44 Misc. 2d 986, 255 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1965), the court held
it was bound under the full faith and credit clause by a California declaratory judgment which upheld, under a Calfornia statute, an ex parte Mexican decree obtained
by one arguably a New York domiciliary, even though the defendant, also a New York
domiciliary, had appeared in neither of the previous actions and had not been personally served. The California statute, apparently CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1915 (West
1955), gave the same effect in California as would be given by the rendering jurisdiction if the rendering jurisdiction had jurisdiction according to its own law.
2 2 See, e.g., Busk v. Busk, 18 App. Div. 2d 700, 236 N.Y.S.2d 336, modifying 229
N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Heine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 19 App.
228
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section 250, in form a presumption of domicile in New York, is of
no effect unless it is read as changing the policies on which Rosenstiel
was based by making domicile of one spouse in the rendering state
the exclusive basis of recognition. 23 In light of widespread preenactment publicity that the law would bar "quickie" Mexican divorces, this interpretation would not seem unreasonable. 234 However, there is an indication that such a result was not intended.
Although section 250 adopts section 2 of the Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, it does not enact section 1 which makes domicile
the basis for out-of-state decree recognition. 235 By failing to enact
section 1, the legislature has refrained from expressly overruling the
New York cases giving comity to foreign country decrees and has
apparently merely opened the door for reconsideration of Rosenstiel
in light of the new reform law. 23 6 Since Rosenstiel was arguably a
judicial attempt at liberalization of a too restrictive divorce law,23 7
section 250 provides the New York courts with the opportunity to
base a withdrawal from Rosenstiel on legislative policy, without
requiring such withdrawal. However, since section 250 cannot
constitutionally foreclose recognition of sister state decrees, such an
interpretation would do little more than increase the cost of evasion
of New York policies by requiring a six weeks' residence in Nevada 238
Div. 695, 242 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1963); Skolnick v. Skolnick, 24 Misc. 2d 1077, 204 N.Y.S.2d
63 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Costi v. Costi, 133 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Caswell v. Caswell,
111 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 280 App. Div. 669, 117 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1952); Leviton v.
Leviton,
6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct.), modfiied, 254 App. Div. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1938).
23
3 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel,
and
Borax, 34 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 26, 62-63 (1966); Comment, 18 SYRACusE L. REv. 71, 86
(1966); Note, 12 N.Y.L.F. 105, 115-16 (1966). If domicile in the rendering jurisdiction
becomes the exclusive basis for recognition, such interpretation would be more restrictive than the UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION AcT § 1, which requires recognition
except when both parties are domiciled in the state entertaining the action challenging
the validity of the decree. However, the uniform law does not extend to cases where
the plaintiff in the foreign decree is not domiciled in the state in which the challenge
is entered, this circumstance apparently to be decided on comity. See Cannon v.
Phillips, 44 Misc. 2d 986, 255 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1965); note 231 supra.
284 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, March 29, 1966,
§ 1, at 15, col. 4.
283",A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction shall
be of no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled
in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced." UNIFORM
DIVORCE
RECOGNITION Aar § 1. See note 233 supra.
2
1See FosTra & FREED, Supp. at 33; A.B.C.N.Y. Report, at 4.
87
* See Rosenstiel v. Rostenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 77-78, 209 N.E.2d 709, 715, 262
N.Y.S.2d 86, 94 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., concurring in part), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966).
228 See NEV.REv. STAT. §§ 10.020, 125.020 (1963).
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Both
rather than a one or two day stay in Juarez and El
periods are significantly less than the potential 120 day delay which
may be required in any case decided in New York2 40 or the two to
three years that will be required for suits based on grounds other
241
than adultery and cruel and inhuman treatment.
CONCLUSION

The New York reform is rife with imperfections. Internal inconsistencies resulting from the compromise of competing policies
and incompatibility of the reform with existing tax and property
law threaten to perpetuate intrastate evasion of the divorce law and
to divert feuding couples from employment of the separation period
innovations in favor of the more traditional and less desirable fault
grounds. The system of conciliation has the possibility of becoming
a mere procedural obstacle because of its complexity, and stands
under a perhaps unfounded pall of uncertainty as to its constitutionality. Finally, an abortive attempt to restrict migratory divorce seems
to have done little more than elicit renunciation and confusion.
Imperfections notwithstanding, the New York reform can be
viewed as a political accomplishment of major proportions. Furthermore, the legislature, apparently in anticipation of difficulties inherent in major reform legislation, delayed the effective date of most
of the reform legislation until September 1, 1967. Such delay
allowed intensive criticism by the organized bar and other interested
groups. The Senate Judiciary Committee considered amendments
which would meet most of the criticisms made herein. However,
under an avalanche of proposals, the legislature ended its term with242
out acting.
289 See Rostenstiel v. Rostenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 73, 209 N.E.2d 709, 812, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86, 90 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966): "The State or country of true domicile
has the closest real public interest in a marriage but, where a New York spouse goes
elsewhere to establish a synthetic domicile to meet technical acceptance of a matrimonial
suit, our public interest is not affected differently by a formality of one day than
by a formality of six weeks."
210 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 215-g (McKinney Supp. 1966); notes 128, 131, 134,
138-39 supra and accompanying text.
211 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
242 See 157 N.Y.L.J., March 17, 1967, at 1, col. 4.

